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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMAX MAGNESIUM CORPORATION, 
Petitioner/Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Defendant 
No. 88-0251 
Priority 14a 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF TO THE BRIEF OF 
AMICUS CURIAE UTAH ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On November 22, 1989, the Court, pursuant to Utah 
Supreme Court Rule 25, granted the Utah Association of 
Counties' ("UAC") motion to file a brief amicus curiae on or 
before November 29, 1989. In the order granting UAC's motion, 
the Court allowed Petitioner twenty days from November 29, 
1989 to reply to the UAC brief. Accordingly, Petitioner 
submits this reply to UAC's brief amicus curiae. 
In its brief amicus curiae, UAC makes three principal 
arguments: (1) Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County* 681 P.2d 
184 (Utah 1984), is controlling with respect to Petitioner's 
challenge to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-4.5 (1984) (''Section 59-5-4.5"); (2) the United States 
District Court's opinion in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 716 F. Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988), relied upon by 
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Petitioner, has no bearing on the constitutionality of Section 
59-5-4.5 because Union Pacific was decided under a specific 
federal statute applicable only to railroads; and (3) 
Allegheny Pittsburg Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 633 
(1989), relied upon by amicus curiae Utah Mining Association, 
is factually distinguishable from this appeal. 
Each of UAC's arguments is not only erroneous, but 
fails to address the underlying constitutional issues involved 
in this appeal. In order to facilitate an orderly review of 
UAC's arguments, Petitioner will address them in the order 
presented by UAC. 
First, Rio Algom is not controlling in this appeal 
because (1) this appeal involves an entirely different version 
of Section 59-5-4.5 than the version considered in Rio Algom, 
(2) the 1984 version of Section 59-5-4.5 at issue in this 
appeal does not attempt to equalize values by adjusting 
valuation methodologies, but rather arbitrarily discounts fair 
market values depending upon whether the methodologies are 
applied by the local or state assessor, (3) the uncontroverted 
facts underlying this appeal are different from the factual 
assumptions relied upon by the Court in Rio Algom, (4) the 
underlying facts assumed in the Rio Algom decision, such as 
the rapid inflation in the prices of residential property 
present during the 1970's, no longer exist, (5) Rio Algom 
never addressed the arbitrary, non-statutory application of 
Section 59-5-4.5 by local assessors to all real, but no 
personal, property regardless of the valuation methodologies 
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applied to either type of property, (6) recent trial evidence 
and findings have confirmed that there was in fact no 
disparity in values between state and locally assessed 
properties in 1984 when Section 59-5-4.5 was reenacted,1 (7) 
subsequent to the Rio Alaom decision a new class consisting of 
railroad property was created within the class of state 
assessed property, and (8) the 2 0% discount previously 
extended only to locally assessed real property has now been 
extended to both real and personal property within a limited 
class of centrally assessed property. 
Second, Petitioner understands that Union Pacific was 
decided under federal, not state, law. The relevance of Union 
Pacific to this appeal, however, springs from the requirement 
of the Utah Constitution that ''all tangible property in the 
state" be taxed uniformly and in proportion to its value. 
With the only relevant exception of residential property,2 
this constitutional mandate extends to all tangible property, 
including railroad property. As a result of Union Pacific, 
state assessed railroad property (both real and personal) now 
receives the same discount extended by Section 59-5-4.5 to 
locally, but not state, assessed property. If Amax's property 
1 See infra discussion of Union Pacific in Section II.B. 
2 In 1982, the Utah Constitution was amended to create a separate class of 
tangible property for residences. Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(8). See 
infra text accompanying footnote 5. The other subsections of art. XIII, 
§ 2 provide tax exemptions based upon the ownership rather than the type 
of property, e.g. property owned by the United States, the State of 
Utah, and religious organizations. None of these other exemptions are 
relevant to this appeal. 
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does not receive uniform treatment with railroad property, 
Amax's rights to uniform, equal and proportionate taxation 
under the Utah and United States Constitutions are violated. 
The Union Pacific Court also found, following a full 
evidentiary hearing on the relative valuation levels of 
locally and state assessed property, that no systemic 
valuation disparity exists.3 This finding of the Union 
Pacific court directly contradicts the assumption of value 
disparity this Court was required to act upon in Rio Alqom 
under the 1981 version of Section 59-5-4.5. By removing the 
underlying assumption of disparate value on which the Rio 
Alqom decision was based, Union Pacific supports the companion 
holding of Rio Alqom that a statute which attempts to shift 
tax burdens from locally assessed to state assessed properties 
is constitutionally impermissible. 
Third, Allegheny is relevant to the issues presented 
in this appeal because of its holding that a taxpayer's equal 
protection rights are violated if the state constitution 
requires tax uniformity and the taxing authorities 
intentionally and systematically place disparate tax burdens 
on different classes of property. This holding of the United 
States Supreme Court demonstrates the unconstitutionality of 
the county assessors' arbitrary, nonstatutory interpretation 
of Section 59-5-4.5. 
3 See infra discussion in Section II.B. 
Section 59-5-4•5 expressly extends a 20% discount to 
all locally assessed tangible property (real or personal) 
which is valued using the comparable sales or cost methods. 
As uniformly applied by the county assessors, however, the 20% 
discount of Section 59-5-4.5 is extended to all locally 
assessed real property, but to no locally assessed personal 
property, regardless of the assessment methodology applied to 
either of these classes of taxable, tangible property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RIO ALGOM V. SAN JUAN COUNTY IS NOT CONTROLLING WITH 
RESPECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 59-5-4.5 (1984). 
UAC first argues that Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan 
County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) is controlling with respect 
to the constitutionality of Section 59-5-4.5. UAC contends 
that the same statute considered in Rio Alaom is at issue and 
that the legislature is entitled to equalize locally and 
centrally assessed property by adjusting valuation 
methodologies. UAC's arguments are misplaced. 
A. The Section 59-5-4.5 Upheld In Rio Algom Is Not 
The Same Section 59-5-4.5 At Issue In This 
Appeal. 
The statute at issue in Rio Alaom was enacted by the 
legislature in 1981. As even a cursory review of the 
legislative history of this enactment discloses, the 
legislature's primary objective was to give homeowners 
property tax relief. Because no classification for 
residential property was sanctioned by the Utah Constitution 
in 1981, however, the legislature could not merely enact 
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l e g i s l a t i o n tha t would reduce the assessment of a homeowner's 
property by an a rb i t r a ry percentage without extending the same 
reduction to other property. Accordingly, the l e g i s l a t u r e 
attempted to achieve t h i s same r e s u l t by reducing by 20% 
assessments made under the valuat ion methods used to assess 
homes, supposedly to account for the nontaxable, in tangible 
items captured by those methods. Nowhere in the enacting b i l l 
or in the accompanying l e g i s l a t i v e debates i s there any 
mention tha t t h i s discount should apply to commercial and 
i ndus t r i a l property owners. Only a f te r the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y 
of the House b i l l extending the discount exclusively to 
" r e s iden t i a l rea l property" was raised in the Senate, was the 
discount extended to a l l loca l ly assessed "taxable proper ty ." 
Even then i t was represented to the l e g i s l a t u r e t ha t the 
appl ica t ion of the discount would be l imited by adminis t ra t ive 
ru le to homeowners.4 
4 The or ig ina l language proposed for Section 59-5 -4 .5 , and adopted by the 
Utah House of Representatives, s tated that the 20% discount should only 
be applied to "res ident ia l real property." See House Debates on H.B. 
164, 44th Leg., 1981 Utah Laws 1165. When the Utah Senate considered 
H.B. 164, they acknowledged that they only wanted homeowners to receive 
the tax discount, but were concerned because the Utah Attorney General's 
Office had opined that the language applying the discount only to 
"res ident ia l real property" would cause the s ta tute to be 
unconst i tut iona l . To resolve t h i s dilemma, the Senate adjourned into a 
committee of the whole to hear testimony of Mr. David Duncan, then Utah 
State Tax Commissioner. Mr. Duncan recommended that the "res ident ia l 
real" language be deleted from the b i l l to prevent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y 
problems. As a pract i ca l matter, Mr. Duncan explained that Commission 
rules would be adopted to guarantee that only "res ident ia l real 
property" received the discount. Based on these statements, the Senate 
amended H.B. 164 to de le te the "res ident ia l real" language, the House 
acquiesced, and H.B. 164 as amended became the 1981 vers ion of sect ion 
59 -5 -4 .5 . See Senate Debates on H.B. 164, 44th Leg., 1981, Utah Laws 
1165. Despite Mr. Duncan's representat ions , the Tax Commission was 
subsequently advised by the Attorney General's Office that an 
administrative rule e f f e c t i v e l y l imi t ing the appl icat ion of H.B. 164 to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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In 1982, the l eg i s l a tu re attempted to remove the 
cons t i tu t iona l prohibi t ion against extending tax r e l i e f solely 
to homeowners by simultaneously repealing Section 59-5-4.5 and 
enacting a 25% re s iden t i a l property tax exemption under a new 
cons t i tu t iona l amendment tha t expressly sanctioned 
d i f f e r en t i a l treatment of r e s iden t i a l property.5 With the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s cons t i tu t iona l amendment by the voters 
l a t e r t ha t year, Section 59-5-4.5 was no longer needed to give 
tax r e l i e f to homeowners.6 
Believing i t had achieved i t s o r ig ina l goal of giving 
property tax r e l i e f only to homeowners, the l eg i s l a t u r e had no 
further dealings with Section 59-5-4.5 u n t i l 1984. In 1984, 
t h i s Court heard Rio Algom, a case tha t was perfected during 
the time Section 59-5-4.5 had been ef fec t ive , and tha t 
questioned the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Sections 59-5-4.5 and 
59-5-109. In Rio Algom, the Court upheld the fac ia l 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
r e s i d e n t i a l real property would suffer the same cons t i tu t iona l defects 
found in the b i l l o r i g i n a l l y passed by the House. Accordingly, no such 
administrative rule was ever adopted by the Tax Commission. Indeed, as 
discussed in Section III below, the county assessors have now 
u n i l a t e r a l l y extended the 20% discount of Section 59-5-4.5 to a l l 
l o c a l l y assessed real property regardless of the valuation methodology 
applied. 
5 The cons t i tu t iona l amendment sanctioning th i s property c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
and r e l i e f was r a t i f i e d by the people of Utah la ter that year in the 
general e l e c t i o n . See Utah Const, art . XIII, § 2 (8 ) : ''The Legislature 
may provide by law for the exemption from taxation of not to exceed 45% 
of the f a i r market value of r e s ident ia l property as defined by Law." 
Upon passage of th i s amendment and i t s enabling l e g i s l a t i o n , Section 
59-5-4.5 was repealed. 
6 See Leg i s la t ive Debates on H.B. 142, 44th Leg., 1982 Utah Laws 249. 
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constitutionality of repealed Section 59-5-4.5, but struck 
down Section 59-5-109 as unconstitutional. 
Section 59-5-109 was a statutory attempt to redress a 
perceived disparity between locally and state assessed 
property by "rolling back" and fixing the value of locally 
assessed property at a 1978 level of value. This Court ruled 
that using a fixed-date valuation factor did not allow for 
value fluctuations that are inherent in property valuations 
and that the application of the roll back to some properties 
and not to others did not provide a uniform assessment as 
required by the Utah Constitution: 
We recognize that § 59-5-109 was enacted to 
redress a disparity between assessments of state-
assessed and county-assessed properties. But if the 
constitution is to be changed to adjust for some 
inequity, the people must make that change by 
constitutional amendment. 
Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 195. 
Because the Court struck down Section 59-5-109, it 
appeared that home values would be adjusted to more closely 
approximate their real 1984 values. This increase in home 
values would have caused a tax shift from state assessed 
properties to locally assessed homeowners. Faced with the 
unpopular consequence of increased taxes to homeowners, a 
special session of the legislature was called to remedy the 
crisis. Noting that the Court had upheld the 1981 version of 
Section 59-5-4.5, the legislature decided that the quickest 
way to replace Section 59-5-109 and prevent the shift of taxes 
-8-
t o homeowners was t o r e e n a c t a modi f ied v e r s i o n of S e c t i o n 
5 9 - 5 - 4 . 5 , as in e f f e c t i n 1981. 
The 1984 v e r s i o n of S e c t i o n 5 9 - 5 - 4 . 5 , however, 
inc luded s e v e r a l a d d i t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . Among o t h e r t h i n g s , 
t h e 1984 v e r s i o n requ ired t h e Tax Commission t o r e s o l v e the 
l e g i s l a t u r e ' s u n c e r t a i n t y regarding t h e a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l of 
d i s c o u n t by s t u d y i n g t h e 2 0% d i s c o u n t assumed for nontaxab le , 
i n t a n g i b l e i t ems captured by t h e comparable s a l e s or c o s t 
methods and de termin ing what t h e a c t u a l d i s c o u n t should be by 
January 1, 1986. 7 
The l e g i s l a t i v e enactment of t h e 1984 v e r s i o n of 
S e c t i o n 5 9 - 5 - 4 . 5 , however, s u f f e r s t h e same c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
d e f e c t s t h a t caused t h e Court t o s t r i k e down S e c t i o n 59-5 -109 
in Rio Algom: (1) t h e l e g i s l a t u r e chose a f i x e d 20% d i s c o u n t 
f a c t o r t h a t would not f l u c t u a t e t o y i e l d t r u e market v a l u e , 
(2) t h e l e g i s l a t u r e a p p l i e d t h e d i s c o u n t t o on ly some 
p r o p e r t i e s w i t h i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s a n c t i o n e d c l a s s and not 
t o o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s w i t h i n t h a t same c l a s s , and (3) t h e 
l e g i s l a t u r e enac ted t h e s e c t i o n not t o a d j u s t a methodology t o 
more c l o s e l y approximate t r u e market v a l u e , but r a t h e r t o 
prevent a s h i f t i n t h e t a x burden from commercial p r o p e r t i e s 
7 See House Debates on H.B. 6, 45th Leg. 2nd Spec. Sess. , 1984 Utah Laws 
Ch. 12. Representative Garff, co-sponsor of H.B. 6 stated: This b i l l 
is "a band-aid approach . . . we essentially don't have the time in the 
next few weeks to completely overhaul the whole tax system . . . . [W]e 
have no other choice but to try to solve [the confusion involved with a 
tax shift] at the present time and then, if you notice in the b i l l , that 
we are providing some new studies to occur . . . [so] in January we can 
make the recommendation as to how we can really bring equity into the 
tax program." 
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to residential properties. Because the Utah Constitution does 
not sanction this type of classification, the legislature 
impermissibly attempted to redress a perceived disparity by 
statute, ignoring the fact that this is something "the people 
. • • must change by constitutional amendment." Rio Alaom. 
681 P.2d at 195.8 
Ironically, after the Rio Alaom case had been argued 
and briefed, but before it was decided, the people had already 
authorized a method for preventing a tax shift to homeowners 
8 One may theorize that the legislature did not have the unconstitutional 
motive of preventing a shift of tax when it reenacted Section 59-5-4.5, 
but was merely attempting to adjust two valuation methods. The 
legislative record, however, does not support this theory and subsequent 
legislative history and the section itself prove this theory to be 
false. Every year as the sunset date approaches for the study 
implementing the true discount percentage, the legislature extends the 
sunset date. See H.B. 404A, 46th Leg., 1985 Utah Laws 841 (sunset date 
extended to January 1, 1987); H.B. 352A, 46th Leg., 1986 Utah Leg. Rep. 
285 (extended to January 1, 1988); H.B. 316, 47th Leg., 1987 Utah Laws 
802 (extended to January 1, 1989); H.B. 308, 47th Leg., 1988 Utah Laws 
693 (extended to January 1, 1990); H.B. 334, 48th Leg., 1989 Utah Laws 
682 (extended to January 1, 1991). Discount studies were performed by 
the Tax Commission soon after the 1984 reenactment; however, these 
studies revealed that the true discount percentage may more closely 
approximate a much smaller percentage. See Legislative Debates on H.B. 
316, 47th Leg., 1987 Utah Laws 802. These figures did not meet 
political favor and the Tax Commission was instructed to try to come up 
with workable figures. No known study is currently being performed by 
the Tax Commission. The legislature knows the 20% discount is 
inaccurate and some legislators have openly referred to the discount as 
the "slush factor." See comments of Senator Hillyard during floor 
debates on H.B. 334, 48th Leg., 1989 Utah Laws 682. Without judicial 
intervention the legislature apparently will continue to use the 20% 
factor indefinitely, just as it did with the 1978 roll back provision, 
because the purpose of the section is not to remedy value disparities 
attributable to different valuation methodologies but to impermissibly 
shift the tax burden from homeowners to state assessed property. 
The language of the section itself reveals that the section was 
crafted to prevent tax shift and not remedy value methods. The discount 
is not extended to all property valued using the specified methods, but 
is given only to all locally assessed property (the group the 
legislature did not want taxes shifted to), without consideration of 
whether state assessed property is valued by one of the methods or not. 
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by enacting the residential property tax exemption provision 
of the Utah Constitution.9 The legislature should be 
required to achieve its goal of extending tax relief to 
homeowners through the approved constitutional process, not 
through the unconstitutional ruse of Section 59-5-4.5 which 
extends a reduction based solely on whether an assessor, 
trained and certified by the State Tax Commission, is employed 
by the county or by the state. 
B. Assuming, Arguendo, That The Statute At Issue Is 
The Same As The One Upheld On Its Face In Rio 
Algom, It Is Unconstitutional As Applied. 
UAC argues that the legislature has the power to 
adjust valuation methodologies to ensure that the resultant 
values more closely approximate fair market value. As an 
abstract principle, Petitioners agree with this statement. 
However, that is not what the legislature did in enacting 
Section 59-5-4.5. When the legislature drafted, and the 
taxing authorities applied, Section 59-5-4.5, they improperly 
applied the discount to fair market values rather than to 
methodologies. 
Article XIII, § 3(1) of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
The Legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment 
on all tangible property in the state, 
9 Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(8) authorizes the legislature to give 
residential property, which was the original target of Section 59-5-4.5, 
a tax discount up to 45%. To date, the legislature has authorized a 25% 
discount. H.B. 142, 44th Leg., 1982 Utah Laws 249. An additional 
residential discount of 20% is still available to alleviate any tax 
shift to homeowners that may result from Section 59-5-4.5 being declared 
unconstitutional. 
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according to its value in money, 
except as otherwise provided in 
Section 2 of this Article. The 
Legislature shall prescribe by law 
such provisions as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of such 
property, so that every person and 
corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, 
or its tangible property . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The objective of Article XIII, § 3(1) is to guarantee that all 
tangible property is uniformly and equally valued and taxed 
according to its monetary value so that every Utah taxpayer 
will bear his fair share of government expenses through 
property taxes in direct proportion to the value of his 
tangible property. The goal is proportionality of tax burdens 
among Utah property taxpayers. The vehicle used to accomplish 
this goal is the selection of appropriate methodologies to 
calculate the fair market value of all types of property. The 
valuation "means" used by the legislature to get to the 
constitutional "end" of fair market value may be various and 
divergent.10 However, once the constitutional "end" of fair 
market value is obtained under whatever means, the legislature 
is not authorized to apply discriminatory tax rates, discounts 
or exemptions to different properties unless expressly 
10 Petitioners note that UAC attached to its brief, as appendices, several 
articles illustrating different appraisal methodologies. Although 
Petitioner agrees that these are recognized appraisal methods, 
Petitioner submits that they are irrelevant to this case where the 
record unequivocally establishes that the same methods used by the Tax 
Commission to value Amax's property would have been used if the county 
had been responsible for the assessment. See infra discussion at 
Section I.C. 
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authorized by one of the exceptions contained in Article XIII, 
§2. As previously discussed, the only relevant exception 
recognized by Article XIII, § 2 is the one extended to 
residential property, not locally versus state assessed 
property or real versus personal property. 
UAC attempts to avoid the inescapable conclusion that 
Section 59-5-4.5 intentionally and systematically discriminate 
between property classes by arguing that Section 59-5-4.5 
adjusts a valuation method before a fair market value is 
obtained. UAC's supposition is simply not true and is totally 
contrary to the record in this appeal.11 But even if UAC's 
claim were true, the discount should apply to all property 
valued by using the comparable sales or cost methods. This is 
not the case. Section 59-5-4.5 extends the statutory 2 0% 
discount only to the fair market value of locally assessed 
property irrespective of whether one of the two statutorily 
suspect methods is used to determine the fair market value of 
state assessed property. 
Many commercial and industrial properties are 
assessed on the local level by using the income or other 
valuation methods. The legislature purportedly did not 
believe that these other methods captured the value of 
nontaxable, intangible items as did the comparable sales or 
cost methods. Nevertheless, as applied by the county 
assessors, locally assessed commercial and industrial 
11 County Assessors apply the 20% discount to fair market values, rather 
than to equalize valuation methodologies. See infra footnote 20. 
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proper t ies receive the same 20% discount to t h e i r assessed 
f a i r market values as loca l ly assessed r e s iden t i a l property. 
Jus t as loca l ly assessed proper t ies are valued by 
d i f fe ren t methodologies, so are s t a t e assessed p rope r t i e s . 
Indeed, some s t a t e assessed p roper t i e s , l ike Amax's in the 
ins tan t appeal, are valued using the same comparable sa les or 
cost methods used by county assessors . Nevertheless, Amax's 
property did not receive the benefi t of the 20% discount for 
1986;12 so le ly because i t was assessed by the Tax Commission, 
r a the r than by the Tooele County Assessor. Tr. a t 151-155, 
206. 
This appl icat ion of Section 59-5-4.5 has resu l ted in 
an a r b i t r a r y tax c l a s s i f i c a t i o n between loca l ly and s t a t e 
assessed p rope r t i e s . Application of the discount has no 
r a t i ona l bas i s , i s not authorized by the Utah or United Sta tes 
Const i tu t ions , and r e s u l t s in in ten t iona l and systematic 
discr iminat ion among s imi la r ly c l a s s i f i ed p rope r t i e s , thereby 
imposing an a rb i t r a ry and capricious tax burden. This 
a r b i t r a r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s contrary to the Utah Const i tut ion 
and the ru l ings of t h i s Court: 
12 Due to a change of factual circumstances which preceded the 1987 tax 
year, the Tax Commission assigned the 1987 assessment r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for 
Amax's property to Tooele County under Utah Code Ann. 59-5-3 (1986). 
This assignment allowed the property to receive the 20% discount in 1987 
s o l e l y because the County performed the assessment. The arbi trar iness 
of the Section 59-5-4.5 discount i s further demonstrated in the fact 
that Tooele County retained, on a contract b a s i s , the same ''state" 
appraiser who performed the 1986 valuat ion to perform the County's 
appraisal of Amax's property in 1987. Transcript of Formal Hearing 
before the Tax Commission (hereafter "Tr.") at 146. 
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[T]he Legislature may not establish formal 
classifications of property that result in 
nonuniform or disproportionate tax burdens. 
Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 193; see also Utah Const, 
art. VIII, § 3(1). 
Section 59-5-4.5 is unconstitutional. If in fact the 
1984 legislature were still worried about nontaxable, 
intangible items being captured by the comparable sales or 
cost methods of assessing property and desired to avoid 
creating an arbitrary and capricious classification in 
granting relief, the law should have provided a discount for 
"all property assessed using the comparable sales or cost 
methods." However, the undisputed evidence in this appeal as 
well as the legislative record clearly demonstrate that the 
legislature was not concerned with equalizing values obtained 
under these two valuation methods with values obtained under 
other methods. Rather, the legislative history and the 
language of Section 59-5-4.5 both demonstrate that the 
legislature was really concerned with preventing a shift of 
tax burdens, a motive already found by this Court in Rio Algom 
to be constitutionally impermissible. 
C. The Uncontroverted Facts Underlying This Appeal 
Establish That Amax's Property Was Valued Using 
The Same Comparable Sales Or Cost Methods 
Applied By Local Assessors. 
For some unexplained reason, UAC only addresses the 
perceived disparity between the fair market values of locally 
assessed property and state assessed property mentioned in Rio 
Algom and never discusses the facts of this appeal. The 
uncontroverted facts in this appeal are: (1) Amax's property 
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was valued using the comparable sa les or cost methods, (2) the 
s t a t e assessor who valued Amax's property used the same 
schedules and valuat ion methods used by local assessors , (3) 
the s t a t e assessed value for the Amax property was the fu l l 
f a i r market value of the property, (4) the value derived for 
the Amax property by the s t a t e assessor was the same as i t 
would have been had the county conducted the valuat ion p r io r 
to applying the 2 0% discount, and (5) when the county ac tua l ly 
valued the Amax property in 1987, i t hired the same s t a t e 
appra iser , who used the same methods used in 1986 when the 
property was s t a t e assessed.13 Tr. a t 146. 
If Section 59-5-4.5 i s upheld as cons t i tu t iona l under 
the fac ts of t h i s case, Amax wi l l be denied the tax discount 
extended to other s imi la r ly s i tua ted commercial and i ndus t r i a l 
property sole ly because the assessor valued Amax's property in 
1986 in h i s capacity as a " s t a t e " assessor r a the r than as a 
s t a t e assessor hired to a s s i s t the " loca l" assessor . This 
a r b i t r a r y and capricious imposition of higher taxes on Amax's 
property cannot be to le ra ted under the Utah Consti tut ion.1 4 
13 In Rio Algom. the Pet i t ioner did not attempt to e s t a b l i s h that i t s 
property was valued at fa i r market value and the Court was l e f t to re ly 
upon a Tax Commission response to P e t i t i o n e r ' s request for admissions 
that P e t i t i o n e r ' s property was not assessed at 100% of current f a i r 
market value . Rio Algom. 681 P.2d at 192, 193 n . 3 . 
14 The uncontroverted fac t s in t h i s appeal reveal that no d i spar i ty 
currently e x i s t s between the value of s ta te assessed and l o c a l l y 
assessed property before appl icat ion of the 20% discount. Tr. at 
151-155, 206. See a l so infra discuss ion in text accompanying Section 
I I . B. 
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D. The Rio Alaom Court Was Never Required to Address 
The Unilateral Application Of Section 59-5-4.5 By 
Local Assessors To Real, But Not Personal Property. 
Section 59-5-4.5 requires that the 20% discount be 
applied to all "taxable property." In Utah, both real and 
personal property are tangible, taxable property.15 Article 
XIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution requires that all tangible 
property be taxed at a "uniform and equal rate" and "in 
proportion to its value." The Tax Commission's and County's 
refusal to apply the 20% discount to personal as well as real 
property (both of which are included in the class of tangible 
property) thus violates not only the express mandate of the 
statute, but also the uniformity requirement of the Utah 
Constitution. 
II. THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CASE CONFIRMS THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 59-5-4.5. 
UAC argues that the United States District Court's 
opinion in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 716 F. 
Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988), is irrelevant to the 
constitutionality of Section 59-5-4.5 because that case was 
decided under federal law. Petitioner recognizes that the 
Union Pacific case was decided under a specific federal 
statute. Unlike UAC, however, Petitioner also recognizes that 
the case is relevant because: (1) it created a separate class 
of railroad property within the class of state assessed 
property, (2) it extended, for the first time, to state 
15 See e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-6(1), 59-5-7 (now codified respectively 
as §§ 59-2-401 and 59-2-924). 
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assessed personal property the same discount applied to 
locally assessed real property, and (3) it found after a full 
evidentiary hearing that there was no systematic disparity 
between state and locally assessed values in 1984. This 
discriminatory treatment is blatantly unconstitutional under 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1) and the 14th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
A. The Utah Constitution And The 14th Amendment 
Require That All Property Be Taxed Uniformly and 
Proportionately. 
Article XIII, § 3(1) requires that "all tangible 
property in the state" be taxed at a "uniform and equal rate" 
"according to its value in money." This provision does not 
state that all the tangible property that is railroad property 
or locally assessed property may be taxed at a lower rate in 
proportion to its value. Rather, it requires that if any 
particular class of tangible property is taxed at a lesser 
rate, the remaining classes must be equalized with the 
benefited class so as to conform with the constitution's 
uniformity and proportionality provisions. Under Article XIII 
it does not matter what caused the creation of the classes. 
All that matters is that all the property in each class is 
taxed proportionately. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently addressed this 
uniform and proportional taxation issue in a case essentially 
identical to this appeal. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Board 
of Equal.. 443 N.W. 2d 249 (Neb. 1989). In Northern Natural 
Gas, the court was required to determine if the provision in 
-18-
the Nebraska Constitution mandating that "all tangible 
property" be taxed "uniformly and proportionately" allowed 
centrally assessed property to be taxed differently from 
railroad property. Neb. Const, art. VIII, § 1. 
Nebraska law exempts the personal property of locally 
assessed taxpayers from ad valorem tax. Unsatisfied with the 
discriminatory nature of this exception, various centrally 
assessed railroads brought suit in the federal courts. The 
Federal District Court for Nebraska and the United States 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the tax scheme was 
discriminatory under the same 4R Act1 applied in Union 
Pacific, and ordered the board of equalization to allow the 
railroads' property the same personal property tax exemptions 
as locally assessed property.17 
After the railroads became entitled to the personal 
property exemptions as a result of their 4R Act challenges, 
two other centrally assessed companies, Northern Natural Gas 
Co. and Enron Liquids Pipeline Co., claimed that under the 
Nebraska Constitution they should be taxed uniformly and were 
entitled to the same personal property tax exemptions the 
railroads received. In reviewing the uniformity provision of 
the Nebraska Constitution and the equal protection clause of 
16 Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the "4R 
Act"), Pub. L. No. 94-210, §306, 90 Stat. 31, 54 (1976) (Codified at 49 
U.S.C. § 11503 (1982)). 
17 See Trailer Train Co. v. Leuenberger. 885 F.2d 415, (8th Cir. 1988); 
Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Leuenberger. No. CV 87-L-565 (D.Neb. 
Dec. 10, 1987); Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Leuenberger. No. CV 88-L-
52 (D. Neb. Jan. 26, 1988). 
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the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court ruled: 
It would seem that no question exists that if 
the [Commission] arbitrarily undervalues a 
particular class of property so as to make 
another class of property disproportionately 
higher, or achieves the same result because of 
legislative action, this court must correct 
that constitutional inequity by lowering the 
complaining taxpayers valuation to such an 
extent so as to equalize it with the other 
property in the state. This being the case, 
no logical reason exists why the same 
requirement of valuation reduction should not 
be imposed when the disproportionately is 
brought about by a final judgment of the 
federal court. 
The State, by not taxing the personal 
property of railroads and car companies, 
although acting involuntarily and under 
compulsion of federal law, nevertheless, by 
complying with that mandate, has denied Enron 
equal protection of the law contrary to the 
14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
Northern Natural Gas, 443 N.W. 2d at 255-256. 
(Citations omitted and emphasis added).18 
For these same reasons, the disparate tax treatment 
between railroad property and Amax's property that resulted from 
the Union Pacific decision violates the the 14th Amendment and 
Article XIII, § 3(1) of the Utah Constitution, which is virtually 
identical to the provisions of the Nebraska constitution 
interpreted in Northern Natural Gas. 
18 To support its conclusion that the 14th amendment was violated, the 
Court cited Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923). In 
Sioux City, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the equal 
protection clause was violated when the county taxed the bridge 
company's property at 100 percent of its value and taxed other property 
in the county at 55 percent of its value. See Petitioner's discussion 
of Sioux City in Opening Brief of Petitioner, p. 22, n. 7. 
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B. There Was No Fair Market Value Disparity In 1984. 
One of the primary j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for UAC's asser t ion 
that the l e g i s l a t u r e was e n t i t l e d to enact Sect ion 59-5-4 .5 i s 
that there was a d i spar i ty between the true market values of 
l o c a l l y and s t a t e assessed propert ies in 1984. However, the 
f rant ic pace of the spec ia l l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s ion which 
generated the 1984 vers ion of Section 59 -5 -4 .5 , demonstrates 
that there was simply no time to determine i f a d i spar i ty in 
values ex i s t ed between l o c a l l y and s t a t e assessed property-
- l e t alone whether the 2 0% discount correc t ly approximated the 
value of in tang ib les captured in the comparable s a l e s or cost 
approach methods.19 
When Judge Jenkins ruled in the Union Pac i f i c case , 
he recognized that the l e g i s l a t u r e had enacted Sect ion 
59-5-4 .5 because of a perceived d i spar i ty . However, a f ter a 
month-long t r i a l and the presentat ion of substant ia l valuation 
evidence by both the s t a t e and the ra i lroad, Judge Jenkins 
found the contention that l o c a l l y assessed property was valued 
above f a i r market value "ignore[d] the evidence" and was 
e n t i r e l y "unpersuasive." Union Pac i f i c , 716 F. Supp. at 565 
n. 51. Furthermore, Judge Jenkins f e l t that the evidence 
presented in the case made "the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s assumptions [ in 
19 The haste with which the l e g i s l a t u r e acted in the 1984 specia l sess ion 
i s evidenced in the debates in which the representat ives recognized that 
the re-enacted sect ion was a "band-aid'' approach to prevent a tax s h i f t . 
See Comments of Representative Wituchi and Garff on House B i l l 1984, 
45th Leg., 2d Spec. S e s s . , 1984 Utah Laws 1165. The language of the 
sec t ion i t s e l f revealed the lack of information avai lable because the 
l e g i s l a t u r e required the Tax Commission to conduct a study to determine 
the true discount factor . 
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r e - e n a c t i n g S e c t i o n 5 9 - 5 - 4 . 5 ] s u s p e c t . " I d . a t 566 n . 52 . 
These f i n d i n g s r e v e a l t h a t S e c t i o n 5 9 - 5 - 4 . 5 i s n o t b e i n g 
a p p l i e d t o e q u a l i z e v a l u e s , b u t i s a r b i t r a r i l y b e i n g u sed t o 
impose a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y t a x b u r d e n on s t a t e a s s e s s e d p r o p e r t y . 2 0 
I I I . ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH COAL CO. V. COUNTY COMM'N IS 
RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL. 
UAC's l a s t a rgument i s t h a t A l l e g h e n y P i t t s b u r g Coal Co. 
v . County Comm'n, 109 S. C t . 633 (1989) h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n t o 
t h i s a p p e a l . T h i s a rgument a g a i n m i s s e s t h e r e l e v a n t h o l d i n g of 
A l l e g h e n y . 2 1 
A l l e g h e n y i s p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s a p p e a l b e c a u s e i t r e v e a l s 
t h a t t h e Utah County A s s e s s o r s u n i l a t e r a l , n o n - s t a t u t o r y r e f u s a l 
t o a p p l y t h e 20% d i s c o u n t of S e c t i o n 5 9 - 5 - 4 . 5 t o p e r s o n a l a s w e l l 
a s r e a l p r o p e r t y , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e i r e x t e n s i o n of t h i s d i s c o u n t 
t o a l l r e a l p r o p e r t y r e g a r d l e s s of t h e v a l u a t i o n method u t i l i z e d , 
i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . As d e m o n s t r a t e d i n P e t i t i o n e r ' s Opening 
20 Judge Jenkin's review of the evidence a l so revealed that the County was 
applying the 20% discount to f a i r market values and not: as a methodology 
adjustment: "The evidence in t h i s case was that the f igures arrived at 
using the comparable sa les and cost appraisal methods of valuation -
before applying the discount - are considered true market value . . . . 
Thus, i f the Court i s to compare true market value , i t should compare 
values before any adjustments for transact ion cos ts or other so -ca l l ed 
intangibles are made. . . . [ t ]he true market value of ' a l l other 
commercial and industr ia l property' in the State of Utah must be 
determined before the 20 percent discount s ta tute i s appl ied." Union 
P a c i f i c . 716 F.Supp. at 565-66 (emphasis added). 
21 Pe t i t ioner supports the arguments presented in the Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Utah Mining Associat ion ("UMA") which adequately rebut any 
contentions UAC may have concerning the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Allegheny. As 
conc lus ive ly demonstrated by UMA, whenever a s ta te has a cons t i tu t iona l 
provis ion requiring uniform taxation and separate c l a s s e s of property 
are burdened at d i f ferent r a t e s , the 14th amendment i s v i o l a t e d . See 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Utah Mining Associat ion ("UMA") at 16-28; 
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Board of Equal.. 443 N.W. 2d at 
255-256. 
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Brief, in the event this Court determines that Amax's property is 
not appurtenant to a mine within the meaning of Section 59-5-3, 
Amax's property will be valued by the Tooele County Assessor. 
Contrary to the express mandate of Section 59-5-4.5, however, 
county assessors apply the 20% discount of Section 59-5-4.5 only 
to real, but not personal property. Not only is this refusal a 
violation of the express statutory requirement that the discount 
be extended to all "taxable property,"22 but it also violates 
Article XIII of the Utah Constitution and the 14th Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. 
In Allegheny the United States Supreme Court explained 
that a state legislature may be allowed under its state 
constitution to create different classifications of property as 
long as they are not arbitrary and capricious. Allegheny 109 S. 
Ct. at 638. In Allegheny, the West Virginia Constitution did not 
authorize the creation of different classes of property, nor had 
the legislature acted to create different property classes. 
Rather, the county assessor had acted under his own initiative to 
apply valuation methods that resulted in a disparate tax burden 
being imposed on otherwise similar properties, thereby 
effectively creating two different classes of property. This 
arbitrary classification by the county assessor and the resulting 
disparate tax treatment could not be tolerated when the state's 
constitution required uniformity in the taxation of property. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court struck down the county's valuation 
22 See supra text accompanying Section I.D. 
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policy as a violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th 
amendment• 
In this appeal, county assessors have also acted on 
their own initiative to discriminatorily apply Section 59-5-4.5 
in a manner that arbitrarily creates property classes that are 
not authorized either by the Utah Constitution or by statute. 
Pursuant to Section 59-5-4.5, ''all taxable" property valued by 
county assessors under the comparable sales or cost methods is to 
receive the 2 0% discount. However, county assessors in Utah have 
refused to extend the discount to any personal property, even 
though personal property is statutorily defined to be taxable 
property. Moreover, the county assessors have uniformly extended 
the 20% discount of Section 59-5-4.5 to all locally assessed real 
property regardless of the valuation methodologies utilized. 23 
No Utah statute authorizes the county assessor to create this 
arbitrary and discriminatory classification between personal and 
real property. Indeed, the Utah constitution requires uniformity 
in the taxation of all property. Allegheny, therefore, requires 
that the assessors7 self-initiated refusal to give personal 
property the same 20% discount extended to real property be held 
to be in violation of the 14th Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The UAC brief amicus curiae does not address either the 
facts or the central constitutional issues presented on this 
23 See supra text accompanying section I.D. 
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appeal and provides no support for upholding the 
constitutionality of Section 59-5-4. 5.24 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of December, 1989 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Mark K. Buchi 
David K. Detton 
David J. Crapo 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 521-5800 
24 As noted in Petitioner's Opening and Reply Briefs, the issues involved 
in this case may be resolved by statutorily interpreting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-3 (1986) to conclude that Amax's property is not *appurtenant" to 
a mine owned by Amax, and Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5(1) (1986) to 
conclude that personal property is entitled to the 20% discount extended 
by Section 59-5-4.5 to all "taxable property" which is locally assessed 
using the cost or comparable sales methods. 
While this Court ordinarily will not address the 
constitutionality of a statute when it can resolve the issues in 
question by other means, this Court has stated that it may nevertheless 
pass upon the constitutionality of the statute if "there is some 
compelling reason why the public interest requires its determination." 
Heathman v. Giles. 374 P.2d 830, 841 (Utah 1962). If this Court 
resolves the issues in this case as a matter of statutory constitution, 
Petitioner submits that the numerous cases pending before every district 
court in this state, as well as the Tax Commission, and the extensive 
briefing and argument presented both by the parties and by amicus curiae 
UMA and UAC, which respectively represent over 125 mining interests and 
all 29 Utah counties, establish "compelling reasons" for the Court to 
address the constitutionality of section 59-5-4.5. 
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